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received the lowest electoral support, the data suggest that this effect is strongest 
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This article explores the dynamics of grants to regional 
governments in Peru. It provides empirical support to the 
hypothesis that the central government’s decisions about 
transfers to regional governments respond, at least partially, 
to political opportunism. Following similar studies for 
other countries, we examine the territorial distribution of 
general resources (called recursos ordinarios in Peru), 
which account for more than 70% of all transfers to 
regions. Since this fund is allocated on a discretionary 
basis, the national government has considerable leeway 
to use the grants to generate political returns.
The theoretical background on the subject is 
twofold. On the one hand, a normative set of policy 
recommendations conceive intergovernmental transfers as 
a way of correcting the potential resource misallocation 
caused by interjurisdictional externalities, the response 
to the need for national standards in public goods and 
the way to address interjurisdictional equity goals and a 
number of other national welfare goals. On the other, the 
political economy approach stresses potential deviations 
from national welfare targets as a result of the central 
government’s use of grants as a pork barrel political 
device. The literature is divided, however, regarding the 
most likely strategy to be used by governments when 
allocating grants. The two most common views are the 
swing-voter approach (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987 
and 1993) and the aligned-region hypothesis (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986). 
This article argues that Peru provides a fertile 
ground for machine politics. As in other Latin American 
countries, the political scenario is difficult to predict 
over time, and the mechanisms for social monitoring of 
the government’s behaviour are relatively weak, which 
facilitates taking larger spoils from office. Moreover, 
the clear dissociation between national versus regional 
political parties in Peru makes it difficult to link the two 
tiers of government through a mutually rewarding strategy. 
This has two implications. First, short-term motives are 
likely to carry the most weight in decisions about which 
regions and functionaries are to receive discretionary 
grants. This situation promotes giving larger transfers to 
more risky and politically profitable regions, where the 
local constituency is highly volatile. Second, the national 
government’s predominant strategy minimizes the potential 
danger of giving support to rising regional leaders and 
thereby maximizes the benefit in terms of votes from less 
supportive regional constituencies. To explore these issues, 
we build an empirical model of the national government’s 
transfer allocation strategy, using a panel data set covering 
the period from 2004 to 2010, to identify the main factors 
in the regional distribution of general resources. While a 
set of normative considerations are properly accounted 
for in the empirical model, the results are generally in 
line with the aforementioned hypotheses.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. 
Section II examines the theoretical and empirical 
literature. Section III describes political institutions and 
the existing regional funding mechanism in Peru. The 
empirical model, the estimation approach and the data 
description are reported in section IV. Our econometric 





Theory and existing empirical evidence
The “public economics” explanation of the behaviour 
of intergovernmental grants clearly distinguishes two 
approaches. One is purely normative, as it stresses the 
view that the donor tier of government follows some 
kind of national utility function (Musgrave, 1958). 
Just as typical market failures impede competitive 
markets from achieving an efficient resource allocation 
for private goods, subnational governments can make 
suboptimal decisions about which type and how much 
of specific public goods are to be provided. Externalities 
between jurisdictions place a wedge between national 
and jurisdictional marginal benefits (or costs) (Oates, 
1972). The need for national standards, the implicit (or 
explicit) principal-agent relationship between central 
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and subnational governments, the aim of having a 
more equitable revenue distribution across the national 
territory and the achievement of an efficient country-
based resource allocation, are all normative justifications 
for grants (Buchanan, 1950; Inman, 1988; King, 1991; 
Letelier, 2012). The second explanation, based on the 
“public choice” approach, states that national fiscal 
decisions will be shaped by the preferences of what is 
known as the median voter. This implies that any grant 
allocation has to follow the demands and geographical 
distribution of the median voter (Boex and Martínez-
Vásquez, 2010). 
Grants can also be analysed from a political 
economy perspective. A number of studies of the 
New Deal experience in the United States, where 
significant grants were allocated to jurisdictions hit 
hard by the Great Depression, question the assumption 
that federal grants really targeted jurisdictions in need 
(Arrington,1970; Reading, 1973). Wright (1974) finds 
a systematic correlation between federal expenditures 
per capita and states’ votes during the New Deal period. 
Similar results are found by Inman (1988) and Couch 
and Shughart (1998), among others. These studies 
generally show that normative arguments for justifying 
federal grants to states fall short of the facts, suggesting 
that redistributive politics played a significant role. This 
last behaviour is commonly known as a “pork barrel” 
policy, and it raises the potential for misallocation of 
public funds when government grants are allocated on 
a discretionary basis.1
If we assume that national grants to regions respond 
at least partially to political economy considerations 
and that voter preferences are self-motivated, then the 
key issue to be addressed hinges on the type of regional 
voters who are more likely to be given larger allocations. 
Two competing views have been put forwards in the 
literature (Cox, 2010). First, the swing-voter hypothesis 
states that regions where a significant number of voters 
are undecided are the most politically attractive areas 
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987 and1993). Case (2001) 
finds evidence of such a pattern in federal grants to 
local governments in Albania. Milligan and Smart 
(2005) show similar evidence for federal grants to the 
five poorest Canadian provinces. Castells and Solé-Ollé 
1  As Grossman (1994) correctly points out, formula-driven grants may 
also be politically motivated insofar as the formula itself is defined by 
the national government. Nevertheless, while this may occur over long 
periods of time, if the formula can be actually changed, it becomes 
more likely that purely discretion-based allocations will be especially 
responsive to pork barrel political considerations.
(2005) conclude that swing voters matter when it comes 
to the allocation of central government grants to regional 
governments for infrastructure in Spain. Additional 
evidence is provided by Wallis (1998) and Gamkhar 
and Ali (2007) for the United States, Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003) for Sweden 
and Gonçalves (2010) for Portugal. For Peru, Schady 
(2000) provides some weak (albeit consistent) evidence 
in favour of the swing-voter hypothesis in a study of 
the National Social and Development Compensation 
Fund (foncodes), which was discretionally allocated 
to provinces in the early1990s.
The second view is that transfers will be allocated 
mostly to regions where the national government 
has the highest support. This is the aligned-region 
hypothesis, which suggests that no clear-cut political 
economy rationale can be found to explain why central 
governments would be equally generous with aligned 
and non-aligned regions. Cox and McCubbins (1986) 
contend that candidates’ promises to their constituencies 
are made in the context of the classic trade-off between 
political returns and risk. If politicians are risk-averse 
(as they probably are) and swing voters are riskier than 
aligned voters in terms of political return, then grants 
are more likely to be given to aligned voters. Supporting 
evidence is provided by Solé-Ollé and Sorribas (2008) in 
the case of Spanish municipalities. For the United States, 
the cases of federal grants to states (Grossman, 1994) 
and federal grants to local governments (Ansolabehere 
and Snyder, 2006) appear to favour this hypothesis. 
Similar results were obtained by Biswas, Marjit and 
Marimoutou (2010) for federal grants to states in India. 
Interestingly, Hanes (2007) finds that only socialist central 
government coalitions (as opposed to conservative ones) 
appear to be more sensitive to vote purchasing among 
municipalities with a high socialist share of voters in 
Sweden. Gonçalves (2010) concludes that European 
funds geared to Portuguese local governments are 
skewed to municipalities where the local ruling political 
coalition is more strongly supported. For Peru, Schady 
(2000) concludes that more resources were given to 
aligned provinces and to those where political support 
for the government in office declined relative to the 
last presidential elections. In opposition to the aligned-
region hypothesis, Segura-Ubiergo (2007) and Graham 
and Kane (1998) show clear stylized facts suggesting 
that throughout the term in office of President Fujimori 
(1990–2001), social grants were discretionally directed 
to areas where the ruling government won the least 
support in the 1993 referendum.
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Some efforts have been made to bridge the gap 
between these approaches. Dixit and Londregan (1996) 
state that if parties are equally able to levy taxes on all 
groups but are more efficient in benefiting their own 
constituency, then machine politics will dominate, and 
more money will be channelled to supportive groups. 
Swing regions will be given higher benefits when 
parties are equally efficient in benefiting all groups, so 
that parties’ vote-maximizing behaviour is consistent 
with targeting moderate groups with loose ideological 
attachments. In a follow-up paper, Dixit and Londregan 
(1998) show that in a world of equity-concerned 
voters, middle-class groups become more politically 
attractive, given their higher concentration of flexible 
voters. Another brand of theoretical research uses the 
traditional portfolio theory to explore how politicians 
allocate money across regions so as to maximize rents 
subject to varying degrees of risk from various assets 
(Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez and Magaloni, 2008; Díaz-
Cayeros, 2008).
Another strand of literature stresses the potential 
impact of interest groups in making the national 
government more sensitive to their demands (Olson, 
1965). While economic redistribution is involved in 
almost every aspect of the political process, singling 
out specific groups can be construed as a tactical (or 
pork barrel) redistribution or even as an attempt to buy 
votes from those most likely to sell them (Anderson and 
Tollison, 1988). Support for this hypothesis in the context 
of the national government’s allocation of transfers has 
been found by Grossman (1994) and Gamkhar and Ali 
(2007) for the United States, Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) 
for Argentina and Biswas, and Marjit and Marimoutou 
(2010) for India. 
The dynamic implications of pork barrel politics 
may also be relevant. Political business cycle theory 
(Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990) suggests that 
the magnitude of grants being used as a tactical device 
will increase in the years leading up to a national election 
to raise the chances of the incumbent’s re-election. 
Numerous studies support the existence of such a 
cycle (for example, Drazen, 2000). The Peruvian case, 
in particular, seems to conform to this pattern. Schady 
(2000) finds that expenditures under foncodes increased 
significantly before elections. Carranza, Chávez and 
Valderrama (2007) look at the period from 1970 to 
1995; they conclude that the combination of strong 
presidentialism and a fragmented political scenario in 
Peru have favoured the use of government expenditure 
as a re-election device.
III
Political institutions and regional funding in Peru
1. The political map in Peru
Peru has a multi-party political system in which different 
parties often form alliances to improve their electoral 
chances. One of the most important parties during our 
sample period (2004–2010) was the Revolutionary 
Popular Alliance (apra), which promotes a social 
democratic ideology with a clear-cut pro-decentralization 
discourse. In contrast to other political forces, apra is 
a well-organized party, and it is the only national party 
with strong roots at the regional and municipal levels. 
Three other parties were also important during this 
period: Possible Peru, a centre-left party founded in 
1994 by Alejandro Toledo; the Christian People’s Party, 
a centre-right party dating back to the 1960s (which has 
some congressional representation, but has never won a 
presidential election); and the Alliance for the Future, 
which was formed by the merger of two pro-Fujimori 
parties (Change 90 and New Majority). After the end of 
our sample period, the formerly small Peruvian Nationalist 
Party had become a strong force by winning the 2011 
presidential election. 
The decentralization process in Peru received a major 
boost in 1989, when Alan García —an apra-supported 
president— created 12 regions with elected regional 
presidents. However significant, this important step 
was temporarily reversed by García’s successor, Alberto 
Fujimori, who carried out a military-supported presidential 
coup in 1992, in which he suspended the constitution, 
shut down the national Congress and blocked political 
regional autonomy. A new constitution was adopted 
in 1993, wherein former regional governments were 
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supplanted by administrative branches of the presidency 
called Transitory Councils of Regional Administration 
(Bensa, 2002). After Fujimori’s downfall in 2000, the 
Congress itself elected a new transitory government which 
called for presidential and congressional elections. The 
new national Congress was to be composed of regionally 
represented members.
Fujimori was succeeded by Alejandro Toledo, a 
Possible Peru candidate who came into power in 2001 
following a very tight election. In an attempt to dampen 
apra leadership, Toledo launched a pro-decentralization 
constitutional reform in April 2002. Regional presidential 
elections were held in November of that year, in which 
24 regional governments were appointed (Tanaka, 2002). 
Although no Possible Peru candidates were elected, 12 
apra-supported regional governments came into power. 
In July 2006, Alan García was elected national president 
for a second term, and regional elections were held in 
November of that year. apra lost 12 regional governments 
in that election, ending up with only two representatives. 
Understandably, budget-approved transfers to regions by 
García’s government were sharply cut from 2006 to 2007.
Political representation at the regional level is 
based on the simultaneous appointment of the regional 
president, vice-president and regional council for a four-
year period. A similar system holds at the municipal level. 
Peru is currently divided into 25 regional governments, 
including the El Callao Constitutional Province (which 
has regional status) and 1,828 municipal governments. 
Twelve regions were in opposition to the national 
government between 2003 and 2006.2 Only two of them 
kept the same regional government and ruling political 
party after the 2006 national election. This shows a 
highly volatile constituency among these regions, which 
provides relevant information as to where the swing 
voters are located.
2. regional funding
With the exception of some minor income from regionally 
provided services, regions in Peru have very few revenues 
of their own (Vega, 2008). Most resources come from 
two main fiscal transfers from the national government: 
earmarked resources (recursos determinados) and 
general resources (recursos ordinarios). The first source 
is fed by taxes on the extractive industry, of which the 
mining canon is the most important. A small share of 
import taxes is also given to regions under this grant, 
2  That is, they had less than 50% support for the national government.
but only Callao receives any. A distinguishing feature of 
earmarked resources is that they are allocated according 
to a well-specified formula that benefits only natural-
resource-producing regions. Given that natural resources 
are very unevenly distributed across the territory, this 
tax-sharing scheme results in a very inequitable regional 
allocation. About 80% of the State’s mining revenues 
is absorbed by one third of all regions (Vega, 2008). 
Moreover, not all transfers in this category are given 
to regional governments, but rather are shared with 
municipalities and local universities.
In contrast to the earmarked resources, general 
resources are assigned on a discretionary basis. They 
originate from national general tax revenues and have 
no link to specific public entities. At the beginning of 
the decentralization process, regional governments 
were made automatically responsible for a much 
larger share of national public revenues. This led the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance to introduce regional 
transfers as a new budget item in 2003, although general 
resources are not formally included under the existing 
institutional framework. A feasible interpretation of 
the Fiscal Decentralization Law suggests that general 
resources should be conceived as a transitory device 
for supporting the regions, until some specific taxes 
are legally committed to regional control. For now, no 
specific rule precludes general resources from being 
assigned discretionally across regions, which then use the 
funds to finance both their staff and local investment. In 
recent years, an increasing share of regional investment 
is being funded through earmarked resources, leaving 
general resources to cover most current expenditures. 
Total transfers to all subnational governments 
(including municipalities) rose from 27% of the general 
government’s budget in 2005 to 37% in 2011 (see table 1). 
There were three main reasons for this sharp rise. First, 
some new functions were delegated to the regions over 
the period under analysis. Second, non-discretional 
transfers grew considerably as a result of a surge in the 
price of gold, copper and oil over the sample period. 
Third, the robust growth of the Peruvian economy over 
the period further contributed. Although the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance is involved in decision-making 
on the distribution of regional grants, a large share of 
general resources comes from the general government 
budget. This, together with the regions’ lack of funding, 
has tended to reinforce the use of political negotiations 
as a major factor in allocating this money. 
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TABLE 1
Transfers to subnational governments in Peru
Type of transfer 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Total general government budget (billions of dollars) 17.64 19.45 22.51 27.69  27.70 31.76 33.63
Transfers to all subnational governments (billions of dollars) 4.80 5.47 6.79 9.97 11.03 11.48 12.30
Transfers as a percentage of general government budget 27.00 28.00 30.00 36.00 40.00 36.00 37.00
Total transfers to regional governments(billions of dollars) 1.67 2.04 2.94 4.543 4.97 5.581 5.35
General resources (billions of dollars) 1.46 1.67 2.171 3.41 3.66 4.06 4.03
General resources as a percentage of regional transfers 87.00 82.00 74.00 75.00 74.00 73.00 75.00
Earmarked resources (billions of dollars) 0.21 0.37 0.77 1.13 1.31 1.52 1.32
Earmarked resources as a percentage of regional transfers 13.00 18.00 26.00 25.00 26.00 27.00 25.00
Source: authors’ elaboration, on the basis of the annual General Budget Law of the Republic of Peru.
IV
Hypothesis testing
1. The empirical model
Our hypothesis is that the national incumbent’s behaviour 
as far as grant allocation is concerned is generally 
determined by a combination of sociodemographic (sd), 
economic (ec) and political (pol) factors. We assume 
that the government’s potential opportunistic bias is 
restricted by various environmental factors. First, there is 
an institutional framework that limits the chance of grants 
being used for electoral purposes. Second, all political 
coalitions respond, at least partially, to the will of the 
median voter. Third, ideology usually matters. Thus, our 
empirical panel model is expected to be represented by 













A key variable to discriminate between the swing-voter 
and aligned-region hypotheses is the degree of regional 
political support for the national government in office. As in 
most empirical papers on this topic, we explore two related 
variables. The first is the share of each regional constituency 
that voted for the national government in office (ng.votes). 
A positive effect indicates that aligned regions are being 
favoured. Second, some studies identify swing regions as 
being close to 51% in support of the national government. 
This share of votes is called marginal votes (mar.votes). 
Both variables are timed by the regional constituency.
The following outcomes may be expected: (i) if 
[∂grant/ ∂ng.votes] > 0 and [∂grant / ∂mar.votes] = 
0, aligned voters are assumed to predominate when 
deciding the assignment of grants; (ii) if [∂grant/ ∂ng.
votes]= 0 and [∂grant/ ∂mar.votes] < 0, it follows that 
swing regions are being favoured; and (iii) if [∂grant/ 
∂ng.votes] <0 and [∂grant/ ∂mar.votes] ≥ 0, the answer 
depends on the composition of the region’s voters. A 
volatile constituency among low ng.votes regions (which 
are the most favoured in this case) indicates that swing 
voters are being targeted. Even if this were not the case, 
option (iii) is compatible with the national government 
having a special skill for reaching beneficiaries from 
low ng.votes regions and a similar capacity to tax all 
regions (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). In Peru, option 
(iii) is the most likely situation, given that in a rapidly 
evolving political setting, voters are usually short-sighted 
in their capacity to penalize the incumbent when it 
results in lower transfers to their region. In this regard, 
we expect that the traditional political cycle as conceived 
by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) may be contaminated by 
the opportunity to withdraw benefits from supporters 
and give them to political opponents immediately after 
the national government is elected.
Another point to consider is whether the degree 
of regional government support is relevant from the 
view point of the national government’s strategy for 
staying in power. We hypothesize that political loyalty 
to regional parties (rg.votes) represents a threat to the 
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national government as regional leaders become more 
popular. For example, Dickovick (2006) argues that 
municipal decentralization in Peru and other countries 
in Latin America is implicitly intended to weaken the 
intermediate level of government. Just as we expect that 
highly supported regional governments are given fewer 
transfers, we also expect that regional governments who 
hold the same party as the national president are likely to 
be particularly benefited. A dummy variable (d.regnat) 
for this case is included.
Among political variables, we assume that national 
authorities are sensitive to lobbying and pressure groups, 
but this channel of local demands is not easily observable. 
We distinguish lobbying (lobby), which expresses in the 
form of both organized and non-organized individuals 
who manage to represent their demands, from more 
radical ways to pressure the national government that 
result in visible political conflict at the regional level 
(conflict). Both forms of pressure may become a threat 
to the central government’s ability to stay in power, so 
grants are likely to be sensitive to them. Additionally, 
regression models include time fixed effects that are 
expected to capture elements of the political cycle and 
a dummy variable to capture the effect of regions where 
the national government got more than 50% of the votes 
in the last presidential elections (D.50).
Regarding non-opportunistic reasons to assign 
grants, we expect that cost push and demand factors 
may affect the government’s willingness to support more 
urbanized or densely populated regions (urban and dens). 
Similarly, the potential role of grants in compensating 
poor regions explains why the poverty rate (pov) might be 
relevant. A fair distribution of public tax revenues calls 
for more transfers to regions in which taxes per head 
are lower. Thus, high per capita regionally generated 
taxes (tax) and high per capita earmarked resources 
(canon) are likely to diminish financial support from 
the central government.
2. estimation approach
The estimation strategy considers two econometric 
specifications of the general model. The first follows 
similar studies in using per capita transfers as the 
endogenous variable. Deviations from an equal per 
capita allocation arguably respond to factors cited above 
(see equation 1). Countries like Spain and Canada are 
explicit in equalizing per capita fiscal capacity across 
regions, which accounts for the local cost of public goods, 
fiscal equalization targets, some measurements of local 
needs, the jurisdictional tax base and a number of other 
indicators (Dahlby, 2008; Bosch, 2009).
The second specification focuses on the level of 
grants being allocated (designated using capital letters). 
All variables are presented in natural logs (ln). In contrast 
to the per capita model, this approach assumes that each 
year’s allocation is based on the amount assigned the 
year before. An obvious challenge with this model is 
the potential correlation between the lagged level of our 
dependent variable, ln (grant_1), and the error term. 
The simple ordinary least squares (ols) estimation of 
this model leads to biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates (see Greene, 2003).To deal with that, we use 
a generalized method of moments (gmm) estimation 
approach, which under reasonable assumptions results 
in consistent, asymptotically normal and asymptotically 
efficient estimators (Hansen, 1982). Both the remaining 
(non-endogenous) variables and the regions’ fixed effects 
are all accounted for as instruments.
3. The data
The appendix provides a full list of the variables, with their 
definitions and sources. grant represents discretionary 
transfers from the central government to the regional 
governments (or). These are assigned annually by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance. Data on this variable 
were taken from the corresponding annual budget, which 
is published on the Ministry’s economic transparency 
website. The political discussion of the budget is based 
on a proposal from the national government, which 
becomes law on approval by the Congress. All data are 
expressed in the Peruvian currency, nuevos soles, at 
constant 2006 prices. The same source was used for the 
variable canon, which captures all regional transfers of 
earmarked resources. Budget items under this category 
were not available before 2007, so for 2004–2006 the 
variable was constructed by summing up all revenues 
(canon) from the exploitation of natural resources in each 
region. The variable tax was taken from the Office of the 
National Superintendent of Tax Administration, which 
is the administrative division responsible for collecting 
taxes. Formally, these data are collected regionally on 
the basis of taxpayers’ fiscal address.
With regard to political variables, conflicts accounts 
for the number of regionally rooted initiatives intended 
to pressure the government to increase funding for 
specific areas. This variable was constructed from 
information provided by the Office of the Ombudsman, 
which classifies such conflicts regionally. The most 
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common sources of lobbying include local (municipal) 
and regional authorities and public officers’ unions, in 
particular teachers. Electoral variables were obtained 
from the National Elections Board, which manages 
electoral processes and records their results.
Sociodemographic variables were provided by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Informatics. Two 
basic data sets are collected by this bureau: the national 
census, whose last version dates to 2007, and the national 
household survey, which is carried out continuously. 
The bureau has published a poverty rate report annually 
since 1997 based on the household survey.
Finally, some caveats on the data are in order. First, 
despite our choice to use budget-based general resources, 
the figures are likely to overestimate actual regional 
expenditures. The budget itself, however, is assumed to 
capture political pressures fairly accurately. Second, the 
data used for the lobby variable are potentially biased 
downwards, as some lobby-related episodes may go 
unrecorded if they are not reported through an official 
note to the authorities in charge. The same holds for 
conflicts. Third, since some related series being considered 
are only available with a lag, the reported regressions 




We expect transfers to be negatively affected by tax 
and canon in the per capita regression (see table 2). 
Although this is precisely the case, only canon appears 
to be significant. A feasible explanation is that grants 
from general resources are used as a compensatory 
device, whereby regions with poor natural endowments 
are given more transfers. The negative —albeit non-
significant— sign of the estimated coefficient for tax 
probably reflects a similar role being played by general 
resources with respect to the general regional tax base. 
Nevertheless, this latter compensatory effect appears 
to be weaker. The regressions in levels provide slightly 
different results (see table 3). One important difference 
is that ln(canon) appears to have a positive effect on the 
level of grants. This may reflect the fact that regions in 
which earmarked resource transfers are important (that 
is, a large value of canon) also have larger demands on 
public infrastructure. Since the regions are responsible 
for this area of government, they should be given more 
resources to manage it. Nevertheless, demand for 
infrastructure is not necessarily related to the value of 
canon per capita, which explains why the signs of the 
estimated coefficients differ between tables 2 and 3. 
In contrast to grants per capita, the level of taxes has a 
significant negative effect on the level of grants. This 
shows that regardless of the population, regions with a 
rich tax base receive fewer transfers.
2. sociodemographic variables
The reported estimates show that pov is not significant in 
any of the regressions except gmm3 (see table 3). This is 
in line with the legal assignment of regional functions as 
defined in the constitutional reform on decentralization 
(Law 27680), the Decentralization Basis Law (Law 
27783), and the Organic Law on Regional Governments 
(Law 27867), all passed in 2002. Regions are meant 
to promote regional economic development, regional 
investment and all services and activities related to 
regional responsibilities. Although these functions are 
ample, they do not explicitly make regions responsible for 
poverty alleviation programmes; this should be taken into 
account when interpreting the above results. While shared 
responsibilities are acknowledged in the provision of basic 
education, health services and employment promotion, 
the national government handles both the funding and 
the administration of poverty reduction programmes.
With regard to density, the positive coefficient 
in per capita estimates suggests that more densely 
populated regions probably have larger inter-jurisdictional 
externalities and congestion costs. This raises the per 
capita cost of regional public goods (the fe2 and fe3 
regressions in table 2), but not the level of transfers 
(Litvack and Oates, 1971).This also explains the sign 
of urban. This variable records the extent to which 
the national population is unevenly distributed across 
regions. As this exacerbates the externality and congestion 
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problems, more grants are likely to be allocated to highly 
urbanized regions. Results consistent with this argument 
are reported in both tables.
The variable pop captures a pure demand effect on 
regional public goods, and in so doing it affects grants 
positively. Since grants are divided by population in 
table 2, this variable is omitted from these regressions, 
whereas it is included in table 3. The results show that 
a 1% increase in population leads to a rise in grants 
between 0.63% and 0.52% (the gmm2 and gmm3 
regressions in table 3).
3. political economy variables
With regard to political economy considerations, the 
variable lobby is significant only in the regressions in 
levels. Exactly the opposite occurs with conflicts. This 
is consistent with the nature of both variables. Since 
conflicts originate in pressure from well-identified groups 
that represent a permanent threat to national political 
stability, they are likely to lead to permanently higher 
transfers per capita over time (see table 2). Alternatively, 
the variable lobby is built on demands expressed to regional 
representatives by a variety of groups and people. Given 
its less specific origin, this variable poses no visible 
threat to national authorities. This is also in line with 
lobby being significant in the regressions in levels only, 
which implicitly means that increased lobbying does not 
necessarily lead to higher grants per capita.
We explore several measurements of voters’ support 
for national and regional governments. As expected, the 
results in table 2 show that highly supported regional 
governments (large rg.votes) appear to receive fewer 
transfers per capita. This is in line with the national 
government’s attempt to dampen potential political 
competition in a rather non-ideological context. A 
similar result is found with the regressions in levels (see 
table 3). Consistently with this finding, econometric 
evidence also suggests that more gains (in terms of new 
votes) are expected to be achieved by sending money to 
non-aligned regions. We find support for this assertion 
when we use d50+ instead of the government support 
variables (fe2 in table 2 and gmm2 in table 3). This 
dummy variable appears to be particularly significant for 
explaining grants per capita (see table 2), in which case 
the results are the same even when ng.votes, rg.votes and 
D50+ are included together in the regression (fe3, fe4 
and fe5). Moreover, grants are positively correlated with 
the regional constituency (gmm1 in table 3). Due to the 
high correlation between constituency and population, 
these regressors are not used together. A direct reading 
of gmm1 says that a 1% rise in constituency leads to 
almost a 0.4% increase in grants. We ran an additional 
regression to include the marginal voter variable (mar.
votes) in fe4 and gmm4. This is done jointly with 50+ 
included in the regression. In both cases, mar.votes is 
significant and has a positive coefficient in fe4, which 
runs counter to some of the evidence in favour of the 
swing-voter hypothesis. The interpretation of this is 
twofold. First, it suggests that swing voters are not 
located in regions where political support for the national 
government is close to 50%, as some empirical studies 
point out. Second, it reveals that the national government 
attributes the highest political return to giving transfers 
to opposition regions. One feasible explanation is that 
taxing support groups, which in this case must be redefined 
as groups receiving lower transfers, does not lead to a 
significant loss of voters relative to the votes being gained 
by favouring opposition groups (Dixit and Londregan, 
1998). While difficult to maintain in the long term, such 
a strategy can be given some credit at the beginning of 
the government’s ruling period, as the relatively higher 
value of the 2007 time effect suggests (see table 2). A 
more time-consistent pattern can be observed by looking 
at how voters from opposition regions behave relative to 
those from supporting regions. Among the 12 opposition 
regions3 during the 2003–2006 period, only two kept the 
same regional government and ruling political party after 
the 2006 national election. This shows a highly volatile 
constituency, which suggests that opposition regions are 
the most likely to include indecisive voters, which in 
turn supports the swing-voter hypothesis.
Evidence of a classic political cycle may also be 
detected. During the period when President Toledo was in 
office (2004–2006), the first sample year (2004) records 
a lower value than the remaining time effects, which is 
also true for 2009. That is, years that are distant from 
presidential elections show smaller and less significant 
coefficients (see table 2).
3  Those with less than 50% support for the national government.
4. Hypotheses versus empirical evidence:  
a summary view
Table 4 highlights our main findings by providing a 
summary of the hypotheses tested and the corresponding 
econometric results. The variables intended to detect 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the national 
government are generally significant and exhibit 
theoretically sound effects. First, discretionary grants 
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appear to be driven by swing voters. On the one hand, 
the aligned-region hypothesis is clearly rejected on 
account of the negative coefficients of ng.votes and 
D.50+, which indicate that non-aligned regions receive 
the most benefits. On the other, the composition of 
regional constituencies seems to be highly volatile (see 
above), which reinforces the assertion that opposition 
regions host the most indecisive voters in our sample. 
A second political economy finding is that regions in 
which the president in office is strongly supported by 
the local constituency receive fewer discretionary grants. 
The negative and significant rg.votes coefficient supports 
this, providing evidence that popular regional leaders 
are likely to be seen as a political threat to the national 
government. A third piece of evidence confirms that 
lobbying (lobby) and interest groups (conflicts) matter. 
Fourth, we also find evidence of a political business 
cycle, as years close to presidential elections record 
higher and more significant time effects. Lastly, the lack 
of statistical significance of d.regnat, which stands as a 
proxy for the extent of ideological interaction between 
the national and regional tiers of government, may be 
interpreted as a sign that ideology does not rank high 
in the grant allocation criteria.
Normative considerations also play a significant role. 
As expected, population (pop), population density (density) 
and urbanization (urban) all affect grants positively. 
Nonetheless, poverty (pov) does not appear to be a factor 
in grant allocation, which is in line with the institutional 
role of the regions in Peru. Similarly, per capita mining 
taxes (canon) affect per head assignments negatively, as 
do taxes in the ln(grant) regressions. As stated above, 
the positive effect of canon on ln(grant) may reflect 
the fact that regions receiving a high level of earmarked 
resources are likely to require more public investment.
Finally, some other feasible hypotheses are 
potentially testable beyond the scope of our database. A 
municipal-based empirical study on the subject matter 
would be a major contribution. Local governments in Peru 
are also given general resources, which are basically used 
to fund social programmes executed by the municipalities 
to fulfil a central government mandate. While they are 
smaller than regional grants, there is plenty of space 
for their allocation to be politically motivated. Another 
potentially interesting extension of this research hinges 
on how municipalities determine property tax collection, 
including who is to be charged and how intensive the 
tax collection effort is.
TABLE 4
expected effects and econometric results
Variable
Effect on grcap Effect on ln(grant)
Expected Estimated Expected Estimated
lobby + ns + +
conflicts + + + ns
ng.votes ? – ? –
rg.votes – – – –
Constituency + +
D.50+ ? – ? –
D.50+× constituency ? ns
mar.votes ? + ? ns
mar.votes ×constituency + ns
canon – – ? + 
tax – ns ? –
pov ? ns ? –
density + + + ns
pop + +
urban ? + ? +
d.regnat + ns + ns
Source: prepared by the authors.
Grcap: grants per capita.
ns: Not significant.
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This research sheds light on the political economy of 
the regional allocation of discretionary grants in Peru. In 
contrast to similar empirical studies for other countries, we 
found that regions in which the national government has 
the lowest support generally receive the largest benefits. 
One feasible explanation for this trend, following Dixit 
and Londregan (1996), is that the national government 
may have a comparative advantage in targeting opposition 
groups, while shifting the cost of this political manoeuvre 
to supporting groups. This scenario is more likely to 
hold at the beginning of the government’s ruling period, 
which is compatible with regression results. Nevertheless, 
the positive association between opposition regions and 
more volatile constituencies suggests than in the long 
term, the swing-voter hypothesis is valid.
Our results also indicate that the national government 
is sensitive to the size of the regional constituency and the 
potential danger of competition from powerful regional 
leaders, which is reflected in the low level of transfers to 
politically strong regional governments. When allocating 
transfers, the national government also appears to be 
sensitive to lobbying from private organized groups and 
regional conflicts. Normative considerations are also 
relevant. More discretionary funds are given to densely 
populated and urbanized regions and to regions with 




Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
grant Discretionary transfers to regions Economic transparency website of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance 
lobby Complaints sent by organized regional residents to the 
national Congress
Congress of the Republic of Peru and Ministry of 
Economy and Finance
conflicts Number of regionally rooted regional conflicts Office of the Ombudsman 
ng.votes [percentage of regional votes for the ruling national 
government] x [regional constituency]
National Elections Board
rg.votes [percentage of regional votes for the ruling regional 
government] x [regional constituency]
National Elections Board
Constituency Regional constituency National Elections Board
D.50+ Dummy variable for regions with more than 50% 
support for the national government
National Elections Board
mar.votes Marginal voter: Absolute value of [percentage of 
regional support for the national government]– 50
National Elections Board
d.regnat Dummy variable for the case in which the national and 
the regional presidents belong to the same political party
National Elections Board
canon Earmarked resources per capita Economic transparency website of the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance
tax Regionally generated taxes per capita Office of the National Superintendent of Tax 
Administration 
pov Regional population below the poverty line National Institute of Statistics and Informatics
density Population density National Institute of Statistics and Informatics 
pop Regional population National Institute of Statistics and Informatics 
urban Degree of urbanization National Institute of Statistics and Informatics 
Source: prepared by the authors.
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